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#### The 1AC employs the metaphor of ‘surveillance’ to understand information acquisition---that’s implies an outdated and inaccurate model of visuality that makes it impossible to understand and react to systems of neoliberal control

Li 17 – Kathy Li, Student in Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, referencing work by Dr. Philip E. Agre, Professor of Information Studies at the University of California, San Diego, PhD in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science from MIT, ““Surveillance and Capture: Two Models of Privacy” – Philip E. Agre”, Digital Media, 11-28, https://digitalmediafall2017.wordpress.com/2017/11/28/surveillance-and-capture-two-models-of-privacy-philip-e-agre/

In this dense but eye-opening piece, Philip E. Agre presents two different, yet overlapping, ways of thinking about privacy. The first, and more familiar, is that of surveillance. The word itself conjures in my mind images of security cameras, The Great Gatsby’s T.J. Eckleburg, 1984’s Big Brother, and other similarly sinister symbols. The surveillance model operates on the assumption that those who misbehave are then caught, and punished as the system sees fit.

The second model of privacy, and the one far more likely to slip under our radar, is that of capture. This model, Agre writes, “has manifested itself principally in the practices of information technologists” (101). Its relatively short history may explain why we are less inclined to think about privacy through this lens. Unlike surveillance, which as a concept has existed for as long as people have defined justice and morality, capture is more discreet and easy to overlook. Agre maintains that whereas the surveillance “originates in the classically political sphere of state action”, the capture model “has deep roots in the practical application of computer systems” (107).

So what exactly does the capture model entail? Here is where Agre’s writing becomes a bit abstract, as he refrains from naming real-world examples of the model in action—and how it impacts us intimately. Capture is probably best understood through the method of tracking (i.e., capturing data), which has been enabled by computerization on an unprecedented scale. Agre outlines several of what he calls “grammars of action” (109): small, seemingly insignificant processes that we take for granted but that have real implications for our privacy. These include telemarketing scripts, toll collection on highways, and automated ordering systems in restaurants. At first glance, these don’t seem to have much in common, but they are all ways of restructuring human activity. Capture is about the acquisition and division of information, not so much through “watching” as through the “parsing” of human activity—dissecting what we do on a day-to-day basis, with or without our awareness.

Agre believes both the surveillance and capture models to be necessary in the conversation surrounding privacy. If surveillance is political, he contends, then capture is philosophical/linguistic. While the surveillance model typically dominates the conversation, it doesn’t account for some of the technological elements of new media. It fails to consider how computerization can compound the collection of data from an individual (i.e., the higher the quantity, the greater the accuracy) in a way that traditional surveillance never could.

In some ways, this contrast between surveillance and capture parallels the one between the discipline and control societies. The discipline society has overt rules. It breaks a person’s world down into separate units: the family, the factory, the school, etc. Boundaries are clearly defined, and they are not to be crossed – potential offenders are dissuaded by the promise of punishment. This model, as Foucault would argue, is outdated, and has been replaced by the control society. In the control society, tools like money are just as effective at mandating behavior as any explicit laws. It’s less about what will be done to you, and more about the fear of what could be done to you. I’m not sure if I buy into the two types of society as being mutually exclusive (I believe we can still see shades of both in the modern day), but there is certainly value in making the distinction. Like Agre’s two models of privacy, they reflect how paradigm shifts have helped reshape behavior over time.

#### Data collection should be understood as ‘capture’, not ‘surveillance’---that shift in language opens space for new models of understanding and is a pre-requisite to effective analysis and political resistance.

Mai 16 – Dr. Jens-Erik Mai, Professor and Head of Department of Information Studies at the University of Copenhagen, Ph.D. in Library and Information Science from the University of Texas, Austin, Master of Library and Information Science from the Royal School of Library and Information Science, “Three Models of Privacy: New Perspectives on Informational Privacy”, Nordicom Review, Volume 37, Special Issue, https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1057031/FULLTEXT01.pdf

Three models of privacy

While there have been a number of proposals for new and improved understandings and definitions of informational privacy in the digital information society, it is my sense that we need to change the metaphors we use to discuss privacy. I will here follow Agre’s (1994) programmatic paper, in which he argues that the notion of privacy ought to be re-conceptualised from a “surveillance model” (Agre 1994: 101) to a “capture model” (Agre 1994: 101). I build on Agre’s work and extend it with a “datafication model” of privacy – I have discussed these models in more depth in a recent paper (Mai 2016a). The objective behind the shift in focus from definitions of privacy to models of privacy is to shift focus from establishing characteristics of privacy with the purpose of determining the definition that captures all aspects of privacy, regardless of time and place, to focus on how privacy works and how thinking about privacy shapes the language we use to discuss privacy. The purpose is not to provide a new and improved definition of informational privacy, but to suggest that in the digital information society we need to think differently about privacy – and I want to show that there is a need for a datafication model of privacy for that purpose.

I will use Agre’s (1994) original, rather loose definition of a model, which is simply: “A ‘model,’ for present purposes, is a way of looking at things; specifically, it is a set of metaphors. Distinct models do not divide the world’s sociotechnical phenomena into nonoverlapping classes.” (Agre 1994: 105). Different models may look at the same phenomena in the world, but they will focus on different aspects and highlight different characteristics. The language used to discuss the phenomena will differ, and different models will use different metaphors to describe the phenomena. Agre operates with metaphorical components that together outline the two models of privacy. Unlike definitions, the aim is not to describe or prescribe the characteristics of privacy, but to provide metaphors that indicate how privacy functions. These following three models of privacy can help us think through the problem space and help us devise possible solutions:

The panopticon model: the metaphor of watching. This is the traditional understanding of privacy and surveillance, and also the model embedded in the language and conceptualisation of this panel. This model applies visual metaphors such as Orwell’s “Big Brother is watching you” and Bentham’s panopticon. The basic idea is that surveillance and the breach of privacy is conducted by someone “watching” someone else, and it is assumed that the watching is “nondisruptive and surreptitious” (Agre 1994: 105). The model applies metaphors such as “the ‘invasion’ of a ‘private’ personal space”, focuses on the “opposition between ‘coercion’ and ‘consent’”, and employs the notion of a bureaucracy’s centralized orchestration of sets of ‘files’ and is as such often identified with “the state, and in particular with consciously planned-out malevolent aims of a specifically political nature” (Agre 1994: 106).

The focus of the panopticon model of privacy is therefore on the tensions between the watchers and the watched, between public and private spheres, and on inherent power relations.

The capture model: the notion of a grammar of action. The capture model changes focus to be primarily concerned with how human activities are constructed in “a computer system’s representation languages”, and as such, the model applies structural metaphors and describes the captured activity as assembled from a “‘catalog’ of parts provided as part of its institutional setting” (Agre 1994: 107). The organization of activities is decentralised and heterogeneous and the activities take place “within particular, local practices that involve people in the workings of larger social formations”, and unlike the panopticon model, the capture model is “not political but philosophical” and the captured activity is “reconstructed through assimilation to a transcendent (‘virtual’) order of mathematical formalism” (ibid.)

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#### The role of the ballot is to determine the efficacy of a topical proposal relative to the status quo or a competing option.

#### The ‘United States federal government’ is the three branches.

U.S. Legal 16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/>]

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### Anticompetitive’ behavior are business practices that restrict competition without providing lower cost or higher quality goods and services

OECD 3 – OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, from the Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law, compiled by R. S. Khemani and D. M. Shapiro, commissioned by the Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, OECD, 1993, https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3145

Definition:

Anticompetitive practices refer to a wide range of business practices in which a firm or group of firms may engage in order to restrict inter-firm competition to maintain or increase their relative market position and profits without necessarily providing goods and services at a lower cost or of higher quality.

#### ‘Expanding the scope’ must increase the area covered by antitrust law.

Cesar A. Noble 17, Judge on the Connecticut Superior Court, Hartford Judicial District, 777 Residential, LLC v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 2017 Conn. Super. LEXIS 4178, \*4-5 (Conn. Super. Ct. August 1, 2017), 8/1/2017, Lexis

The defendant relies upon §7-249 as authority for the supplemental assessment. The statute provides that "[b]enefits to buildings or structures constructed or expanded after the initial assessment may be assessed as if the new or expanded buildings or structures had existed at the time of the initial assessment." The parties dispute whether the conversion of the property constitutes a construction or expansion of buildings or structures granting authority to the defendant to levy a supplemental assessment. The plaintiff argues that because the conversion did not constitute an expansion, that is, an increase in the volume or physical area of a building the defendant had no authority under §7-249 for the supplemental assessment. 5 In the view of the plaintiff it is significant that the conversion did not increase the physical footprint or interior square footage of the property in any way including by a vertical [\*5] enlargement. Absent such an increase, asserts the plaintiff, there can be no construction or expansion of any building or structure. The defendant assert that the construction of the 285 new residential units constitute new structures within the plain meaning of §7-249. The court agrees with the defendant.

[FOOTNOTE]

5 The plaintiff relies upon the definition of the word "expand" found in Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 2002) of "to open up; to increase the extent, number, volume, or scope of."

#### The ‘core’ antitrust laws are Sherman, Clayton, and FTC.

Michael A. Rataj 21, PC, Law Degree from the Detroit College of Law, “Consequences for Breaking Antitrust Laws”, 5/12/2021, https://www.michaelrataj.com/blog/2021/05/consequences-for-breaking-antitrust-laws/

The core antitrust laws are…

The three core antitrust laws are the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act. The Sherman Act primarily prohibits unreasonable restraint of trade and monopolization. Those who are in violation of the Sherman Act may face hefty fines, up to $100 million, and up to 10 years behind bars.

The FTC Act prohibits unfair practices or acts and unfair approaches to harming competition. Only the FTC can file cases under this act. The Clayton Act is a catch-all that covers every practice not covered by the Sherman and FTC Acts. Then consequences for violations of both of these acts are usually civil in nature.

#### Only topical affirmatives provide roles for each side key to the process of negation---two impacts:

#### 1) Clash---prepared negative strategies are based on method. Allowing the aff to skirt that question while retaining traditional competition standards makes being neg impossible. Clash is an intrinsic good and vital to the overall process of debate. An open topic prevents iteration through shallow debates, unpredictable advocacies, and lack of testing.

#### 2) Fairness---voluntary activities require it to actualize their benefits---only the ballot can adjudicate which model is fairest and overcome cognitive biases that otherwise cause a race to the bottom.

Hansson et al. 21, Kajsa Hansson, Ph.D. student at Linköping University, M.S. in Economics from Linköping University; Emil Persson, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Economics at Linköping University, Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Gothenburg; Shai Davidai, Assistant Professor in the Management Division of Columbia Business School, Ph.D. from Cornell University; Gustav Tinghög, Associate Professor in the Department of Management and Engineering at Linköping University, “Losing sense of fairness: How information about a level playing field reduces selfish behavior,” Journal of Economics Behavior & Organization, Vol. 190, October 2021, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.07.014

Why is aggressive, hostile, and selfish behavior so rampant in competitive settings? Using a novel experimental paradigm, we found that the absence of explicit information about a level playing field increases people’s tendency to engage in selfish behavior. Whereas participants who formed their own subjective beliefs about the fairness of a competition more frequently engaged in self-serving and selfish behavior, providing explicit information about the level playing field reduced such behavior. However, while this information reduced selfish behavior among losing participants, it did not affect behavior among winners of the competition. Losers who formed their own subjective beliefs of the playing field believed that the competition was unequally stacked against them. In contrast to losers who were informed about that both participants competed under the same sets of rules, they were more willing to engage in selfish behavior following the competition.

Our results suggest that information about a level playing field can reduce the “moral wiggle room” which people use to justify selfish behavior.9 Just as people are more prone to engage in selfish behavior when the consequences of their actions are sufficiently vague and uncertain, (e.g., Dana et al., 2007; Exley, 2016; Haisley and Weber, 2010), we find that the absence of explicit information about the procedure of a competition may have similar effects on selfish behavior, and especially so among those who end up losing.

How well people perform in competitive settings is the product of numerous factors, many of which are beyond people’s control. For instance, whether people perform well or poorly in a competition is determined by their inherent ability or skill, by the amount of effort they devote to the competition, by their opponents’ abilities and skills, by the amount of effort devoted by each of their opponent, by external factors that advance or hinder their and their opponents’ performance, and so forth. People typically focus on only a subset of such factors when thinking about their and others’ performance (Davidai and Gilovich, 2015). Yet, the myriad of elements that influence performance provide people with sufficient flexibility to feel as if their relative inferiority is due to factors outside their control rather than personal inadequacy. Consequently, by forcing people to take responsibility for their performance and learn from their failures, informing people about a level playing field may have other positive effects beyond reducing selfish behavior.

Our results are consistent with findings from previous studies showing that losing a competition increases the demand for redistribution, even when people make choices for two other participants (i.e. absent any selfish motives) (Cassar and Klein, 2019; Deffains et al., 2016; Espinosa et al., 2020). In line with the results from our study, Espinosa (2020) showed that when participants are informed that outcomes of a competition is determined by brute luck — i.e., whether one was randomly assigned to perform either a hard or an easy task — before the competition begins, winners and losers of the competition display similar redistributive preferences when making decisions for other people. We add to this literature by showing that the effect of informing people about a level playing field also decreases selfish behavior. Although previous studies have found that actual procedural unfairness that involves unequal opportunities increases unethical and selfish behavior (e.g., Banerjee et al., 2018; Fehr, 2018; Gill et al., 2013; Greenberg, 1990; Grosch and Rau, 2020; John et al., 2014), our findings highlight the immensely important role that perceived procedural fairness plays in zero-sum competitions, where resources are scarce, and several people compete for the same rewards.

Because disagreements regarding fairness may result in aggression, hostility, and conflict between successful and unsuccessful individuals, understanding when and why the outcomes of competitions are considered legitimate is extremely important. Simply put, leaving people “in the dark” regarding the playing field may undermine cooperation, trust, and legitimacy in society. Unfortunately, this dynamic is often seen in our own back yard, where wayward researchers tend to lose sight of the common goal of the scientific endeavor and instead engage in misconduct, fraud, and uncooperative behavior to promote their own selfish goals (e.g., John et al., 2012). We suggest that by bolstering people’s beliefs about a level playing field, transparency can reduce such self-serving and often-destructive research practices. Whereas arranging fair procedures and practices is of upmost importance for creating a more just and ethical society, informing people about this procedural fairness is key.

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Radical Humanism K

#### A positive orientation towards history and the ideals of radical humanist freedom are key to global liberationist struggles---only this can avert every major existential crisis of our times.

Maulana Karenga 06, Professor and Chair Department of Africa Studies at Cal State University and a major figure in the Black Power movement., Philosophy in the African Tradition of Resistance: Issues or Human Freedom and Human Flourishing in Not Only the Master’s Tools, 2006, p. 242-5

Surely, we are at a moment of history fraught with new and old fOnTIS of anxiety, alienation, and antagonism; deepening poverty in the midst of increasing wealth; proposals and practices of ethnic cleansing and genocide; pandemic diseases; increased plunder; pollution and depletion of the environment; constant conflicts, large and small; and world-threatening delusions on the part of a superpower aspiring to a return to empire, with spurious claims of the right to preemptive aggression, to openly attack and overthrow nonfavored and fragile governments openly, and to seize the lands and resources of vulnerable peoples and establish "democracy" through military dictatorship abroad, all the while suppressing political dissent at home (Chang 2002; Cole et at. 2002). These anxieties are undergirded by racist and religious chauvinism, by the self-righteous and veiled references of these rulers to themselves as a kind of terrible and terrorizing hand of God, appointed to rid the world of evil (Ahmad 2002; Arnin 2001; Blum1995). At the same time, in this context of turmoil and terror and the use and threatened use of catastrophic weapons, there is the irrational and arrogant expectation that the oppressed will acquiesce, abandon resistance, and accept the disruptive and devastating consequences of globalization, along with the global hegemony it implies (Martin and Schumann 1997). There is great alarm among the white-supremicist rulers of these globalizing nations, given the metical resistance rising up against them, even as globalization’s technological, organizational, and economic capacity continues to expand (Barber 1996; Karenga 2002e, 2003a; Lusane 1997). There is great alarm when people who should "know" when they are defeated ridicule the assessment, refuse to be defeated or dispirited, and, on the contrary, intensify and diversify their struggles (Zepezauer 2002). Certainly the battlefields of Palestine, Venezuela, long suffering Haiti, and Chiapas, Mexico, along with other continuing emancipatory struggles everywhere, reaffirm the indomitable character of the human spirit and the durability and adaptive vitality of a people determined to be free, regardless of the odds and assessments against them. Indeed, they remind us that the motive force of history is struggle, informed by the ongoing quest for freedom, justice, power of the masses, and peace in the world. Despite "end of history" claims and single-super- power resolve and resolutions, these struggles continue. For still the oppressed want freedom, the wronged and injured want justice, the people want power over their destiny and daily lives, and the world wants peace. And all over the world-especially in this U.S. citadel of aging capitalism with its archaic dreams of empire-clarity in the analysis of issues, and in the critical determination of tasks and prospects, requires the deep and disciplined reflection characteristic of the personal and social practice we call philosophy. But this sense of added urgency for effective intervention is prompted not only by the critical juncture at which we stand but also by an awareness of our long history of resistance as a people, because in our collective strivings and social struggles we seek a new future for our people, our descendants, and the world. Joined also to these conditions and considerations is the compelling character of our self-understanding as a people, as a moral vanguard in this country and the world. For we have launched, fought, and won with our allies struggles that not only have expanded the realm of freedom in this country and the world but also have served as an ongoing inspiration and a model of liberation struggles for other marginalized and oppressed peoples and groups throughout the world. Indeed, they have borrowed from and built on our moral vocabulary and moral vision, sung our songs of freedom, and held up our struggle for liberation as a model to emulate. Now, self-understanding and self-assertion are dialectically linked. In other words, how we understand ourselves in the world determines how we assert ourselves in the world. Thus, an expansive concept of ourselves as Africans-continental and diasporan-and as Africana philosophers forms an essential component of our sense of mission and the urgency with which we approach it. It is important to note that I have conceived and written this chapter within the framework of Kausaida philosophy (Karenga 1978, 1980, 1997) Kawaida is a philosophic initiative that was forged in the crucible of ideological and practical struggles around issues of freedom, justice, equalitys, self-determination, conullunal power, self-defense, pan~African- ism, coalition and alliance, Black Studies, intellectual emancipation, and cultural recovery and reconstlouction. It continued to develop in the midst of these ongoing struggies within the life of the mind and stmggles iottbtn the life of the people, as well as within the context of the conditions of the world. Kawaida is defined as an ongoing synthesis of the best of xAfrican thought and practice in constant exchange tuttb tl3e 'U)()ltd. It characterizes culture as a unique, instructive and valuable way of being human in the world-as a foundation and framework for self-understanding and self-assertion. As a philosophy of culture and struggle, Kawaida maintains that our intellectual and social practice as Nricana activist scholars must be undergirded and informed by ongoing efforts to (1) ground our- selves in our own culture; (2) constantly recover, reconstruct, .and bring forth from our culture the best of what it means to be African and human in the fullest sense; (3) speak this special cultural truth to the world and (4) use our culture to constantly make our own unique contribution to the reconception and reconstruction of this country, and to the forward flow of human history.

#### The AFF’s hunt for the abandonment of this world comes at the expense of changing this one---that cedes control to the colonizer and reinforces binaries that justified colonialism in the first place---recognizing the multi-faceted nature of this world allows solidarity to enact a concretely cosmopolitan politics.

Gary Wilder 16, Associate Professor, Anthropology, The Graduate Center of the City University of New York, “Here/Hear Now Aimé Césaire!” The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 115, No. 3, July 2016, p. 585-604

These key terms illuminate crucial aspects of what made Césaire a distinctive thinker whose critical voice may continue to resonate for us today. But in order to attend to Césaire as he did his predecessors—as a contemporary— we should recognize how his intellectual orientation and insights brush against the grain of many current theoretical tendencies. In both critical theory and postcolonial studies, the standard operation is to unmask purportedly universal categories as socially constructed, culturally particular, and implicated in practices, systems, and logics of domination. These are indispensable critical moves. But this approach often devolves into a hunt for traces of universalism or humanism, whether in textual artifacts or political projects, in order to reveal the regressive or oppressive essence of the object. This “aha” moment thus becomes the punch line of the discussion rather than the starting point for analysis. Such fears of complicity with power do not only belie a longing for intellectual and political purity. They also make it difficult to think dialectically, to identify aspects of given arrangements that may point beyond their actually existing forms.

The current insistence on negative critique also makes scholars reluctant to identify desirable alternatives and specify the kind of world they might want to create. But what do we concede if we are unable or unwilling to risk affirming more just, more human, ways of being to which we can say “yes”? It is not easy for radical thinkers to reconcile a nonprescriptive orientation to a radically open future with the imperative to envision more desirable arrangements (Coronil 2011). But ignoring or deferring the challenge does not make it disappear. Following anticolonial thinkers like Césaire, especially those located within the black Atlantic critical tradition, may remind us not to forfeit categories such as freedom, justice, democracy, solidarity, and humanity to the dominant actors who have instrumentalized and degraded them.

Given this dilemma, the attention paid to Vivek Chibber’s recent polemic against subaltern studies is not surprising. Such attention, however, seems to be less about the merits of his universalist Marxism than about a sense of some of the limitations and impasses into which certain currents of postcolonial thinking have led (Chibber 2013).7 Partha Chatterjee himself has recently written, “The task, as it now stands, cannot . . . be taken forward within the framework of the concepts and methods mobilized in Subaltern Studies . . . what is needed are new projects” (2012a: 44). He suggests that such projects should probably focus on “cultural history” and “popular culture” with a renewed focus on visual materials and embodied practices rather than written texts and on ethnography rather than intellectual history. Moreover, he links this invitation to study “the ethnographic, the practical, the everyday and the local” to a focus on subnational “regional formations” and “minority cultures” and languages whose specificities, he observes, had not been sufficiently engaged by earlier subaltern studies research on “India,” “Pakistan,” or “Bangladesh” (47–49). Valuable as such studies would surely be, it is not clear how a renewed focus on locality, with place-based assumptions about territory, consciousness, and categories, could do the kind of critical work necessary to grasp the deep shifts in political logics, structures, and practices that characterize the world-historical present. On the contrary, such approaches risk reproducing precisely the culturalist and territorialist assumptions about political identification and affiliation that need to be rethought in light of contemporary conditions.8

Chatterjee’s surprising emphasis on local ethnography seems consistent with one trend in postcolonial thinking that risks reviving the types of civilizational thinking, and associated assumptions about origins and authenticity, that it had earlier set out to dismantle (Chakrabarty 2007; Mah- mood 2005; Mignolo 2011). Consider the important ways that Talal Asad has invited us to rethink liberal assumptions about “tradition,” with respect to liberal and nonliberal forms of life. In dialogue with Ludwig Wittgenstein and Alasdair MacIntyre, Asad (1986) has developed a powerful critique of liberal secularism—and the secularist logic that subtends many modern liberal states—from the standpoint of embodied and discursive traditions. On the one hand, he reminds us that “Islamic tradition” is neither singular nor unchanging; it is a structured and dynamic space for reasoned argument. On the other hand, he reminds us that despite liberalism’s claims to post- traditional neutrality, it too constitutes a particular tradition (albeit one that defines itself in opposition to inherited, embodied, and practice-oriented forms of tradition-based reasoning).

Asad’s genealogical insights have rightly informed recent critiques of Western liberal ideologies, states, and politics especially regarding their arrogant, condescending, and violent responses to tradition-rooted practices and practitioners, whether outside or inside the West. But his interventions, however unintentionally, have also led scholars to establish dubious chains of equivalence between modernity, the West, and liberalism. Such operations seem to disregard Asad’s important invitation to understand traditions as capacious, heterogeneous, and dynamic spaces of inquiry, disputation, and revision, not simply as a set of rigid behavioral scripts, unchanging cultural formulas, or dogmatic ideological precepts. This reduction of political modernity to a one-dimensional liberalism obscures, for example, the many currents of progressive antiliberalism within the tradition of modern Western political thought. It fails to recognize the significant number of non-European colonial intellectuals engaged in anti-imperial struggles who were active participants in such “traditions within traditions.” It also disregards the contradictions within and redeemable fragments of even liberal political thinking, fragments that, if realized, might point far beyond, and possibly explode, liberalism itself.

To reify modern or Western politics into a static and stereotypical liberalism is to risk practicing an unfortunate form of “Occidentalism” that would reinforce archaic civilizational assumptions about incommensurable and unrelated worlds (and worldviews) and disregard the actual history and open possibilities for practices of cross-cultural solidarity whereby anti-imperial actors outside Europe could enter into dialogue or affiliate with, or even discover ways that they are already situated within, counterhegemonic “Western” political traditions. Critics have rightly mobilized singularity, incommensurability, or untranslatability against liberal attempts to discover an abstract humanity and thereby discount situated and embodied forms of life. But the question is whether we treat incommensurability or untranslatability as an epistemological or political limit or as an always imperfect starting point for practices of dialogue, coordination, affiliation, reciprocity, solidarity. For isn’t the impossibility of full transparency or undifferentiated unity simply the unavoidable condition within which all communication, sociality, and politics must be attempted?9

My point is not to congratulate dissident currents within the West, let alone to recuperate liberalism. It is rather to approach radical and emancipatory politics from a place of not-already-knowing, of not presuming to know a priori which aspects of a tradition are irredeemable, which traditions may become allies or habitations, what the boundaries of (thoroughly plastic) traditions must be. This nondogmatic and experimental orientation to politics, traditions, and concepts is one of the most precious and timely gifts that Césaire may offer to us now. He practiced a concrete cosmopolitan relationship to modern traditions of philosophy, aesthetics, and politics, one that was highly developed by the robust tradition of black Atlantic criticism within which he was firmly rooted along with predecessors (e.g., Toussaint and W. E. B. DuBois), contemporaries (e.g., C. L. R. James, James Baldwin, Suzanne Césaire, Senghor), and descendants (e.g., Fanon, Edouard Glissant, Stuart Hall, Paul Gilroy, Achille Mbembe, David Scott).

Understandable concerns about totalizing explanation and Eurocentric evaluation have led a generation of scholars to insist on the incommensurable alterity of non-European forms of thought. But perhaps we should be concerned less exclusively with unmasking universalisms as covert European particularism than with also challenging the assumption that the universal is European property. I read Césaire not in order to provincialize European concepts but to deprovincialize Antillean thinking. Césaire’s critical reworkings remind us that the supposedly European categories of political modernity properly belong as much to the African and Caribbean actors who coproduced them as to the inhabitants of continental Europe. Similarly, African and Caribbean thinkers, no less than their continental counterparts, produced abstract and general propositions about “humanity,” “history,” and “the world.” In contrast to invocations of multiple modernities, Césaire never granted to Europe possession of a modernity or universality or humanity that was always already translocal and fundamentally Caribbean. He never treated self-determination, emancipation, freedom, equality, or justice as essentially European and foreign. Césaire’s intellectual and political interventions radically challenged reductive territorialist approaches to social thought. He refused to concede that “France” was an ethnic or continental entity, that Martinique was not in some real way internal to “French” society and politics, or that he was situated outside of modern critical traditions. Thus his ongoing and unapologetic engagements with Hegel, Marx, Proudhon, Nietzsche, Lautréamont, Rimbaud, Mallarmé, Bergson, Freud, Breton, Frobenius, and Lenin, alongside his many African, Antillean, and African American interlocutors.

The sonic blurring between “here” and “hear” in the title of this essay is meant to signal not only the contemporaneity of Césaire’s thought for us here now but the imperative that we open ourselves to his presence and recognize his actuality across the epochal divide by hearing what he actually said. This gesture builds on Walter Benjamin’s insight that every now is a “now of recognizability” whereby “what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation” through which past epochs become newly legible (1999: 462). I also follow Césaire himself, who engaged in dialogue with predecessors as if they were contemporaries and who addressed future interlocutors directly as if they were already present. Like Benjamin, Césaire practiced a form of radical remembrance that connected outmoded pasts to charged presents. This attention to vital histories was bound up with a poetic politics that identified transformative possibilities dwelling within existing arrangements and a proleptic politics that anticipated seemingly impossible futures by trying to enact them concretely in the here and now. But Césaire can only speak to us now if we listen rather than presume to know what someone like him in his situation must have, or should have, been saying.

Until very recently, scholarship on his work has been overdetermined by methodological nationalism (that puzzles over his refusal to pursue state sovereignty), identitarian culturalism (that debates how adequately Césaire expressed Antillean lived experience and whether or not he was an essentialist), and a disciplinary division of labor (that too often splits his poetry, criticism, and politics into separate domains). Generally, Cold War scholarship was shaped by a need to evaluate him in relation to canonical anticolonial nationalists and fit him into a narrative of decolonization-as-national-independence. This has made it difficult to recognize the epochal character, world-making ambition, and global sensibility of his political reflections.

Faced with the promise of decolonization, Césaire conjugated concrete acts with political imagination in ways that displaced conventional oppositions between aesthetics and politics, realism and utopia, pragmatism and principle. Such efforts were animated by what I have been calling radical literalism and utopian realism and which he called inflection and poetic knowledge. He regarded freedom as a problem whose institutional solution was not self-evident and could only be situational. His interventions demonstrated the nonnecessary relationship between colonial emancipation, popular sovereignty, and self-determination, on the one hand, and territorial state sovereignty and national liberation, on the other. He pursued cosmopolitan aims concretely through transcultural practices and by attempting to invent new political forms through which to ground plural and postnational democratic arrangements.

We should recognize that Césaire formulated a critique not of Western civilization from the standpoint of African or Antillean culture but of modern Western racism, imperialism, and capitalism from the standpoint of Antillean and African historical situations and experiences. More generally, it was a critique of an alienated and alienating modernity from the standpoint of embodied and poetic ways of being, knowing, and relating (to self, others, and world). Above all, Césaire recognized residues of, and resources for, more just, human, and integrated ways of living together within Antillean, African, and European texts, traditions, forms, histories, and conditions. In his view, Antilleans—as culturally particular actors, imperial subjects, New World denizens, moderns, and humans—were their rightful heirs. He was concerned less with defining culturally authentic concepts, spaces, and arrangements for Antilleans (apart from Europe or uncontaminated by modernity) than with overcoming imperialism, in solidarity with other struggling peoples, in order to establish less alienated forms of human life globally.

Remembering Césaire’s insistence that modern currents of radicalism were shared legacies and common property may help us to rethink inherited assumptions about the relation between territory, ethnicity, consciousness, and interest (Buck-Morss 2009, 2010). They invite us to deterritorialize social thought and to decolonize intellectual history. This is a matter not of valorizing non-European forms of knowledge, as important as such a move certainly is, but of questioning the presumptive boundaries of “Europe” itself—by recognizing the larger scales on which modern social thought was forged and of appreciating that colonial societies produced self-reflexive thinkers concerned with large-scale processes and future prospects. We can thereby recognize Césaire as a situated postwar thinker of the postwar world, one of whose primary aims was to place into question the very categories “France,” “Europe,” and “the West” by way of an immanent critique of late imperial politics. He envisioned postnational arrangements through which humanity could attempt to overcome the alienating antinomies that had impoverished the quality of life in overseas colonies and European metropoles. His situated humanism and concrete cosmopolitanism should thus be placed in a constellation of modern emancipatory thinking oriented toward worldwide human freedom that included antiracist, anti-imperial, internationalist, and socialist thinkers from a range of traditions: black Atlantic, First Internationalist, global anarchist, Western Marxist, Marxist humanist, Third Worldist.

Césaire believed that the future of humanity depended in some sense on its recovering a lost poetic relation to “the throbbing newness of the world.” Why not regard Césaire’s “humanism made to the measure of the world” as a starting point for our critical thinking about the contemporary situation and the kind of world we would like to create. Césaire, like Toussaint before him, addressed future interlocutors directly. At the same time, his thinking about future possibilities was refracted through dialogue with predecessors like Toussaint. This is how I understand what one of his heirs, Glissant, means by “a prophetic vision of the past” based on “the identification of a painful notion of time and its full projection forward into the future” (1989: 64; see also Glissant 2005: 15, 16). Césaire once wrote of Schoelcher, the socialist republican architect of the 1848 abolition of slavery in France, that it would be “useless to commemorate him if we had not decided to imitate his politics” (1948a: 28). In this spirit I hope that the recent resurgence of interest in Césaire is not only treated as an occasion to honor his memory but is seized as an opportunity to hear his transgenerational address. We can thus think with Césaire about the relation between existing theoretical frameworks, the world we are confronting, and urgent political desires— especially with regard to the history of empire and the role of colonial intellectuals as modern thinkers of global processes.

#### The AFF’s conceptualization of anti-blackness creates a false dichotomy between destroying this world or being subjected to it---that homogenizes the experience of the 35 million black people in the U.S. and displaces the possibility of pragmatic practices which can resist anti-blackness.

David Kline 17, PhD, Department of Religion at Rice University, 2017. The Pragmatics of Resistance: Framing Anti-Blackness and the Limits of Political Ontology,” Critical Philosophy of Race, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2017, p. 51-69

Wilderson’s critique of Agamben is certainly correct within the specific framework of a political ontology of racial positioning. His description of anti-Black antagonism shows a powerful macropolitical sedimentation of [End Page 56] Black suffering in which Black bodies are ontologically frozen into (non-) beings that stand in absolute political distinction from those “who do not magnetize bullets” (Wilderson 2010, 80). In the same framework, Jared Sexton, whose work is very close to Wilderson’s, is also right when he shows how biopolitical thought—specifically the Agambenian form centered on questions of sovereignty—and its variant of “necropolitics” found in Mbembe has so often run aground on the figure of the slave (see Sexton 2010).5 Locating the reality of anti-Blackness wholly within this account of political ontology does provide an undeniably effective analysis of its violence and sedimentation over the modern world as a whole. However, in terms of a general structure, I understand Wilderson’s (and Sexton’s) political ontology to remain tied in form to Agamben’s even as it seemingly discounts it and therefore remains bound to some of the problems and limitations that beset such a formal structure, as I’ll discuss in a moment. Despite the critique of Agamben’s ontological blind spots regarding the extent to which Black suffering is non-analogous to non-black suffering, as I’ve tried to show, Wilderson keeps the basic contours of Agamben’s ontological structure in place, maintaining a formal political ontology that expands the bottom end of the binary structure so as to locate an absolute zero-point of political abjection within Black social death. To be clear, this is not to say that the difference between the content and historicity of Wilderson’s social death and Agamben’s bare life does not have profound implications for how political ontology is conceived or how questions of suffering and freedom are posed. Nor is it to say that a congruence of formal structure linking Agamben and Wilderson should mean that their respective projects are not radically differentiated and perhaps even opposed in terms of their broader implications and revelations. Rather, what I want to focus on is how the absolute prioritization of a formal ontological framework of autonomous and irreconcilable spheres of positionality—however descriptively or epistemologically accurate in terms of a regime of ontology and its corresponding macropolitics of anti-Blackness—ends up limiting a whole range of possible avenues of analysis that have their proper site within what Deleuze and Guattari describe as the micropolitical. The issue here is the distinction between the macropolitical (molar) and the micropolitical (molecular) fields of organization and becoming. Wilderson and Afro-pessimism in general privilege the macropolitical field in which Blackness is always already sedimented and rigidified into a political onto-logical position that prohibits movement and the possibility of what Fred Moten calls “fugitivity.” The absolute privileging of the macropolitical as [End Page 57] the frame of analysis tends to bracket or overshadow the fact that “every politics is simultaneously a macropolitics and a micropolitics (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 213). Where the macropolitical is structured around a politics of molarisation that immunizes itself from the threat of contingency and disruption, the micropolitical names the field in which local and singular points of connection produce the conditions for “lines of flight, which are molecular” (ibid., 216). The micropolitical field is where movement and resistance happens against or in excess of the macropolitical in ways not reducible to the kind of formal binary organization that Agamben and Wilderson’s political ontology prioritizes. Such resistance is not necessarily positive or emancipatory, as lines of flight name a contingency that always poses the risk that whatever develops can become “capable of the worst” (ibid., 205). However, within this contingency is also the possibility of creative lines and deterritorializations that provide possible means of positive escape from macropolitical molarisations.

Focusing on Wilderson, his absolute prioritization of a political onto-logical structure in which the law relegates Black being into the singular position of social death happens, I contend, at the expense of two significant things that I am hesitant to bracket for the sake of prioritizing political ontology as the sole frame of reference for both analyzing anti-Black racism and thinking resistance within the racialized world. First, it short-circuits an analysis of power that might reveal not only how the practices, forms, and apparatuses of anti-Black racism have historically developed, changed, and reassembled/reterritorialized in relation to state power, national identity, philosophical discourse, biological discourse, political discourse, and so on—changes that, despite Wilderson’s claim that focusing on these things only “mystify” the question of ontology (Wilderson 2010, 10), surely have implications for how racial positioning is both thought and resisted in differing historical and socio-political contexts. To the extent that Blackness equals a singular ontological position within a macropolitical structure of antagonism, there is almost no room to bring in the spectrum and flow of social difference and contingency that no doubt spans across Black identity as a legitimate issue of analysis and as a site/sight for the possibility of a range of resisting practices. This bracketing of difference leads him to make some rather sweeping and opaquely abstract claims. For example, discussing a main character’s abortion in a prison cell in the 1976 film Bush Mama, Wilderson says, “Dorothy will abort her baby at the clinic or on the floor of her prison cell, not because she fights for—and either wins [End Page 58] or loses—the right to do so, but because she is one of 35 million accumulated and fungible (owned and exchangeable) objects living among 230 million subjects—which is to say, her will is always already subsumed by the will of civil society” (Wilderson 2010, 128, italics mine). What I want to press here is how Wilderson’s statement, made in the sole frame of a totalizing political ontology overshadowing all other levels of sociality, flattens out the social difference within, and even the possibility of, a micropolitical social field of 35 million Black people living in the United States. Such a flattening reduces the optic of anti-Black racism as well as Black sociality to the frame of political ontology where Blackness remains stuck in a singular position of abjection. The result is a severe analytical limitation in terms of the way Blackness (as well as other racial positions) exists across an extremely wide field of sociality that is comprised of differing intensities of forces and relational modes between various institutional, political, socio-economic, religious, sexual, and other social conjunctures. Within Wilderson’s political ontological frame, it seems that these conjunctures are excluded—or at least bracketed—as having any bearing at all on how anti-Black power functions and is resisted across highly differentiated contexts. There is only the binary ontological distinction of Black and Human being; only a macropolitics of sedimented abjection.

Furthermore, arriving at the second analytical expense of Wilderson’s prioritization of political ontology, I suggest that such a flattening of the social field of Blackness rigidly delimits what counts as legitimate political resistance. If the framework for thinking resistance and the possibility of creating another world is reduced to rigid ontological positions defined by the absolute power of the law, and if Black existence is understood only as ontologically fixed at the extreme zero point of social death without recourse to anything within its own position qua Blackness, then there is not much room for strategizing or even imagining resistance to anti-Blackness that is not wholly limited to expressions and events of radically apocalyptic political violence: the law is either destroyed entirely, or there is no freedom. This is not to say that I am necessarily against radical political violence or its use as an effective tactic. Nor is to say that I think the law should be left unchallenged in its total operation, but rather that there might be other and more pragmatically oriented practices of resistance that do not necessarily have the absolute destruction of the law as their immediate aim that should count as genuine resistance to anti-Blackness. For Wilderson, like Agamben, anything less than an absolute overturning [End Page 59] of the order of things, the violent destruction and annihilation of the full structure of antagonisms, is deemed as “[having nothing] to do with Black liberation” (quoted in Zug 2010). Of course, the desire for the absolute overturning of the currently existing world, the decisive end of the existing world and the arrival of a new world in which “Blacks do not magnetize bullets” should be absolutely affirmed. Further, the severity and gratuitous nature of the macropolitics of anti-Blackness in relation to the possibility of a movement towards freedom should not be bracketed or displaced for the sake of appealing to any non-Black grammar of exploitation or alienation (Wilderson 2010, 142). The question I want to pose, however, is how the insistence on the absolute priority of framing this world within a rigid structure of formal ontological positions can only revert to what amounts to a kind of negative theological and eschatological blank horizon in which actually existing social sites and modes of resisting praxis are displaced and devalued by notions of whatever it is that might arrive from beyond.

It seems that Wilderson, again, is close to Agamben on this point, whose ontological structure also severely delimits what might count as genuine resistance to the regime of sovereignty. As Dominick LaCapra points out regarding the possibility of liberation outside of Agamben’s formal ontological structure of bare life and sovereignty,

A further enigmatic conjunction in Agamben is between pure possibility and the reduction of being to mere or naked life, for it is the emergence of mere naked life in accomplished nihilism that simultaneously generates, as a kind of miraculous antibody or creation ex nihilo, pure possibility or utterly blank utopianism not limited by the constraints of the past or by normative structures of any sort. (LaCapra 2009, 168)

With life’s ontological reduction to the abjection of bare life or social death, the only possible way out, it seems, is the impossible possibility of what Agamben refers to as the “suspension of the suspension,” the laying aside of the distinction between bare life and political life, the “Shabbat of both animal and man” (Agamben 2003, 92). It is in this sense that Agamben offers, again in the words of LaCapra, a “negative theology in extremis . . . an empty utopianism of pure, unlimited possibility” (LaCapra 2009, 166). The result is a discounting and devaluing of other, perhaps more pragmatic and less eschatological, practices of resistance. With the “all or nothing” [End Page 60] approach that posits anything less than the absolute suspension of the current state of things as unable to address the violence and abjection of bare life, there is not much left in which to appeal than a kind of apocalyptic, messianic, and contentless eschatological future space defined by whatever this world is not.

#### **Hope is necessary to sustain black politics and visions, give meaning to struggles for justice, and is worthwhile even if it fails to achieve all of its intentions---totalizing ideologies are bad.**

Michael Dawson 01, Center for the Study of Race, Politics, and Culture @ University of Chicago, BLACK VISIONS: THE ROOTS OF CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES, pp. 322-3

We must ﬁnally ask whether African Americans can rely on a totalizing ideology to shape our visions of black justice and our future in America. My answer is no. I believe we need a more ﬂexible approach than ideologies such as black Marxism, black nationalism, and at least the Cold War version of liberalism have allowed. We need a black critical theory that draws on and combines liberalism’s concern with individual rights and autonomy, republican concerns with community, socialist concern with an egalitarian society and economic justice for all, feminist traditions such as resistance to suppressing intragroup differences in the name of a false and oppressive unity, and blends these with recognition of the need for autonomous organization and cultural pride. No single world view or ideology comfortably accommodates all of these. But a critical theory can—and such a theory must be *political*. We’ve had a black aesthetic, black power, and a plethora of black public policy pronouncements. But a black political theory has to embody a theory of the state, power, human nature, and the good life. And such a theory must be based on the hope for and potential of the improvement of human nature while recognizing the wickedness of the world. Kantian pronouncements about systems that can be governed by devils have led us to a world where ethnic strife and nuclear and other horrors proliferate. We must strive for something better, something democratic, something cosmopolitan, not in the elite sense but in the sense that, since homogeneity is a thing of the past, even within states, we must fall back on our basic humanness. It is no coincidence that within American political thought this perspective appears most often in the black traditions and in black political thought, at least in the contemporary period—most often in the black feminist tradition. Thus the best legacy of black political ideologies for America is a tough, activist, inclusive democracy willing to challenge privileges of power and resources in the name of a grander vision which asserts that we are more than the mere aggregation of our individual preferences. Its morality, while democratic, would not be based on the latest consumer fad nor use the return to stockholders as the ﬁnal arbiter of the public good. That we often fail in living up to our standards of justice within black activism as well as within America—that we are imperfect as individuals and as communities—does not mean, as King so eloquently demonstrated, that the vision itself is not a worthy goal. What black critical theory and each black ideology have demonstrated is that the doable, the mundane, incremental reform of the workings of American society is not enough; only the full promise of America has the potential to be truly liberating. Any other solution is not only unsatisfactory—it is likely to provoke the kind of deadly conﬂict most clearly seen in the Civil War but also seen today in the rapid upward spiral of political and personal violence which results as people measure their circumstances against what they see as the lies that fester at the center of the American Dream. A new, black, critical theory needs to retain one aspect of black ideological visions. At the heart of all of the black visions is a sense of pragmatic optimism combined with a steadfast determination to gain black justice. Both the optimism and the determination are needed now as ever to sustain the political projects and new visions of African Americans.

#### The alternative is to reclaim a radical humanism and equality.

Rochard Pithouse 16, Senior researcher, programme coordinator and supervisor at the Unit for Humanities at Rhodes University, “Frantz Fanon: Philosophy, Praxis, and the Occult Zone,” Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy, Vol. XXIV, No 1, 2016, p. 116-138, http://www.jffp.org/ojs/index.php/jffp/article/viewFile/761/723

Racism, as ideology, is organised around the assertion that humanity is riven by an ontological split. In the consciousness of the racist, and in the general intellect of racist social formations, this ontological split is taken as part of what Immanuel Kant called the a priori, the categories through which sense is made of experience.61 This deception of reason, this “racist rationality”62 results in racist societies producing forms of knowledge that, while authorised as the most fully formed instances of reason at work, are fundamentally irrational.

In The “North African Syndrome”, an essay first published in 1952, Frantz Fanon wrote that in the French medical establishment:

(T)he attitude of medical personnel is very often an a priori attitude. The North African does not come with a substratum common to his race, but on a foundation built by the European. In other words, the North Africa, spontaneously, by the very fact of appearing in the scene, enters into a pre-existing framework.63

In other words medical science in colonial France allowed a priori ontological assumptions to prevent it from making rational sense of experience.

In Black Skin, White Masks, published in the same year, Fanon also offers a critique of philosophy in colonial France. He insists that the lived experience of the black person is not congruent with any (philosophically orthodox) “ontological explanation” because “The black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man.”64 Fanon stresses that racism is not only unreasonable but that it structures the a priori categories through which experience is mediated in a manner that makes it impossible to recognise reason expressed from black embodiment as reason: “[W]hen I was present, it was not; when it was there, I was no longer.”65

The inability to recognise black reason as reason produces an inability to recognise black political agency – a distortion of reality all too evident in both historiography and contemporary attempts to think the political. In his discussion of the evident fact that, in the colonial imagination, the Haitian Revolution “entered history with the peculiar characteristic of being unthinkable as it happened” Michel-Rolph Trouillot writes that:

the contention that enslaved Africans and their descendants could not envision freedom – let alone formulate strategies for gaining and securing such freedom – was based not so much on empirical evidence as on an ontology, an implicit organization of the world and its inhabitants.66

He goes on to show that racist ontology continued to structure the historiography of the Haitian Revolution for the next two centuries.

Lewis Gordon, riffing off Fanon as well as W.E.B. du Bois, uses the idea of illicit appearance to theorise the absence “of the right of appearance” beyond the right to appear as reasonable resulting in invisibility and hypervisibility – “the effect of which is the erasure of individuating or contextualizing considerations - that is, human invisibility.”67 “When you come down to it” Fanon wrote in The North African Syndrome, “the North African is a simulator, a liar, a malingerer, a sluggard, a thief.”68

Lewis and Jane Anna Gordon, writing together, argue that across space and time elites generally assume that the system in which they have prospered is ultimately good and that the people that disrupt its smooth functioning must be problem people – even monsters. Gordon and Gordon point out that in anti-black societies, black people are rendered monstrous “when they attempt to live and participate in the wider civil society and engage in processes of governing among whites...Their presence in society generally constitutes crime.”69

Fanon begins the pivotal fifth chapter of Black Skin, White Masks with the cauterisation of an affirmation of a desire for sociality: ““I came into the world imbued with the will to find a meaning in things, my spirit filled with the desire to attain to the source of the world, and then I found that I was an object in the midst of other objects.”70 The chapter concludes with the defeat of all attempts to attain recognition in a racist world: “I wanted to rise, but the disemboweled silence fell back upon me, its wings paralyzed. Without responsibility, straddling Nothingness and Infinity, I began to weep.”71

His response to the impossibility of a dialectic of recognition72 is not to give up on the aspiration for a world of mutuality, of universal humanism (predicated on a universal ontology) – he still aspires to a world that will recognise “the open door of every consciousness”73 - but to accept that he has found himself in a world “in which I am summoned into battle”74 and to commit to action: “To educate man to be actional, preserving in all his relations his respect for the basic values that constitute a human world, is the prime task of him who, having taken thought, prepares to act.”75 In Gordon’s estimation the Fanonian position is that “Legitimacy doesn’t emerge from the proof of cultural heritage or racial authenticity, it emerges...[Fanon] argues, from active engagement in struggles for social transformation and building institutions and ideas that nourish and liberate the formerly colonized.”76

This commitment to praxis is a politics that, in Gordon’s formulation, requires a commitment to “meeting people on the terrain where they live”77 with a view to forging what, as noted above, Mbembe calls “a radical future orientated politics in this world and these times.”78 Such a politics, it is asserted here, must be grounded in what S’bu Zikode first called a ‘living politics’79 and what Lewis Gordon calls ‘living thought’ or ‘thinking as a living activity’.80 It requires a decisive break with the idea, all too frequently present in South Africa, that radical politics is fundamentally a matter of rallying ‘the masses’ to the authority of a group of people who, whether situated in a party, a proto-party or an NGO, imagine themselves to be an enlightened vanguard.

This is not the apocalyptic politics that, as is sometimes the case in Aimé Césaire’s work, is more concerned with eschatology than praxis. In the Notebook of Return to my Native Land Césaire, in a manner that in some respects anticipates some currents in contemporary Afro-pessimism, affirms that the only thing work starting is “The end of the world!”81 and anticipates the one glorious moment82, the brilliant new dawn in which “the volcanoes will break out and the naked water will sweep away the ripe stains of the sun and nothing will remain but a tepid bubbling pecked at by sea birds – the beach of dreams, and demented awakening”83, a rising of a new sun that would “burst open the life of the shacks like an over-ripe pomegranate.”84 In this vision, in which the political is sublimated into the theological, the authentic radical gesture is, ultimately, to disavow the world as it is and to wait for the birth of a new world.

Again unlike Césaire Fanon does not accept the ontological split introduced into the conception of humanity authorised by colonial racism. His evident commitment to the universal85, and action to affirm a universal humanism86, situates him in a line of black radical thought that runs from Toussaint Louverture87 to Biko88, Jean-Bertrand Aristide89 and, arguably for that matter, the constant insistence on the barricades on South African streets of words to the effect of ‘we are human not animal’.90

But like Césaire Fanon’s radical vision is not, at all, a commitment to what Césaire, writing in 1956, termed ‘abstract equality’. Césaire remarks that:

To prevent the development of all national consciousness in the colonized, the colonizer pushes the colonized to desire an abstract equality. But equality refuses to remain abstract. And what an affair it is when the colonized takes back the word on his own account to demand that it not remain a mere word!'91

From a South African perspective this condemnation of ‘abstract equality’ sounds almost prophetic but it has always been a colonial response to black insurgency. In in 1801 Napolean wrote, from St Helena, of the French policy, with regard to Haiti, of “disarming the blacks while assuring them of their civil liberty, and restoring property to the [white] colonists.”92

For Fanon emancipation has many aspects. These include a spatial aspect,93 a material aspect,94 the attainment of equality between women and men,95 but, also, and fundamentally, the sovereignty of the human person. Liberation must, he insists, in Sekyi-Otu’s revised translation, "give back their dignity to all citizens, fill their minds and feast their eyes with human things and create a prospect that is human because conscious and sovereign persons dwell therein.”96 In contemporary South Africa this cannot take the form of the sole defence of abstract rights, a politics primarily organised around exploitation via the wage relation or the sort of nationalism that is naïve about the cleavages with the nation. It must to, to return to Mbembe, “take the form of a conscious attempt to retrieve life and ‘the human’ from a history of waste.”97

## Case

### Case---1NC

#### Big companies are better, and breaking them up fails.

Richard A. Epstein 20, Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law at the New York University Law School, Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago, LL.B. from Yale Law School, “Is There An Antitrust Crisis In Big Tech?”, Hoover Institution, 10-12-2020, https://www.hoover.org/research/there-antitrust-crisis-big-tech

The report further misunderstands the reach of the antitrust laws when claiming that “the dominant platforms have misappropriated the data of third parties that rely on their platforms, effectively collecting information from customers only to weaponize it against them as rivals.” Data misappropriation is an evident wrong, but not one confined to large firms with monopoly power. Quite the opposite, any firm can misappropriate data that it receives in the ordinary course of business. Accordingly, contracting parties can, and usually do, develop private solutions to limit the misuse of data. Customer lists, for example, can be protected—and strong protocols can prevent employees and outside lawyers and accountants from engaging in insider trading.

Antitrust remedies, including breaking up firms, only complicate these processes. Nor is it likely that the antitrust law can provide a remedy against Facebook’s use of customer data to improve its advertising metrics—customers clearly like access to the Facebook network at zero price, and it is hard to think of any antitrust remedy that can fashion some optimal contract to deal with issues of explicit monopoly extraction.

#### Private sector isn’t key to surveillance.

Atkinson et al. 19, Robert D. Atkinson, President of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, founding member of the Polaris Council who advices the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s Science, Technology Assessment, and Analytics team, Ph.D. from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; Doug Brake, Director of Broadband and Spectrum Policy at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, J.D. from the University of Colorado Law School; Daniel Castro, Vice President and President of the Center for Data Innovation at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, M.S. in Information Security Technology and Management from Carnegie Mellon University; Colin Cunliff, Senior Policy Analyst at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, Ph.D. from the University of California, Davis; Joe Kennedy, Senior Fellow at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, Ph.D. from George Washington University; Michael McLaughlin, Research Analyst at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, M.A. from Stanford University; Alan McQuinn, Senior Policy Analyst at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, B.S. from the University of Texas at Austin; Joshua New, Senior Policy Analyst at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, Ph.D. from the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, “A Policymaker’s Guide to the ‘Techlash’—What It Is and Why It’s a Threat to Growth and Progress,” Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, 10-28-2019, https://itif.org/publications/2019/10/28/policymakers-guide-techlash

In addition to concerns about online consumer privacy, some critics are concerned that the emerging era of a fully connected world—wherein sensors, cameras, and microphones are embedded in a vast array of networked devices—will inevitably lead to pervasive surveillance. Accusations fly that with the introduction of new technologies, such as police-worn body cameras and facial-recognition systems, a Big Brother security state is tracking citizens’ every movement. These fears have led to significant public resistance to governments introducing new projects, such as ID systems and smart-city initiatives.143

Some are concerned about data collection by the government, such as compilations of biometric data by law enforcement agencies. For example, the Center on Privacy and Technology has accused the U.S. government of essentially creating a “virtual, perpetual line-up,” with law enforcement having access to such databases as driver’s license photos, passport photos, and mug shots.144 Others are concerned about “Little Brother”: data collected by the private sector that government can then access to monitor its citizens.145 Critics says their homes are no longer private, as video-equipped doorbells and smart speakers allow companies to spy on families and their neighbors.

Those who worry about government surveillance have a legitimate basis for their concerns. Governments in some countries have disturbing histories of intruding into the private lives of their citizens—and many fear they may revert to this type of activity in the future. And other countries, such as China, significantly limit the personal freedoms of their citizens, and use surveillance to threaten human rights. Concerns about surveillance reached new heights following the leak of classified documents by Edward Snowden, which showed that, at a minimum, there was a significant disconnect between the amount of surveillance conducted by the intelligence community and what many believed was lawful.146

Concerns about private-sector surveillance are less justifiable. While there have been some notable infractions—such as rogue employees tracking the location of ride-share customers, and engineers reviewing video and audio recordings from smart home devices where consumers were unaware—these incidents are uncommon. Moreover, companies have a strong market incentive not to engage in unauthorized surveillance because they face the risk of substantial customer backlash, and often fines by government.

While many technologies can be used for surveillance, these types of uses are less inevitable or likely in democratic, rule-of-law nations. Governments can adopt new technologies without becoming a surveillance state by putting in place reasonable controls to ensure their uses have appropriate oversight and do not intrude on citizens’ rights. Critics often complain that adopting new technologies risks going down a slippery slope, when in practice, the slope does not appear to be too slippery. For example, in 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Jones that police cannot use the Global Positioning System (GPS) to track individuals without a warrant; and in 2018, the Supreme Court similarly held that accessing historical cell phone location records is unlawful without a search warrant.147 Moreover, there is a long history of members of the public expressing similar privacy concerns about new technologies such as automatic license plate readers, RFID-equipped passports, drones, and red-light cameras—and yet their sky-is-falling rhetoric has proven unfounded.148

Many new technologies will potentially be used to track and monitor individuals. However, the risk of these technologies being used for that purpose will remain low so long as Congress continues to provide strong oversight of law enforcement and the intelligence community, and strengthens Fourth Amendment protections where necessary to ensure government does not gain access to citizens’ location data without a search warrant. In short, the answer to risks of mass surveillance are best addressed by the right rules, not by banning what is virtually always societally beneficial technology.

#### Surveillance is not a unified, totalizing system of juridical violence

Currah 14 – Paisley Currah, Professor of Political Science and Women’s & Gender Studies at Brooklyn College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, M.A and Ph.D. in Government from Cornell University, “The State”, TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly, Volume 1, Numbers 1-2, May

For the Left, however, the liberal state and the principles of political equality it celebrates conceal the maldistribution of equality. A certain domesticated form of selfhood is reproduced when individuals petition the government for recognition of their particular selves and, in turn, recognize themselves when they are hailed by various state apparatuses — interpolation is the term of art used to describe this relationship. From this more radical perspective, then, the transgender rights movement is merely insisting that the hailing be more accurate. A transgender man will now have an M on his driver's license, and the police officer who stops him on the street may call him “sir” rather than “ma'am.” But the power of the state to surveil individuals and to regulate gender remains intact. While the political approach of many trans legal advocates requires them to naturalize gender identity, the more radical trans Left recognizes that “sex” cannot be made to fit into a rigid presocial biological schema of male and female. On the question of sex classification, the goal should not be to install the “right” definition of sex in the regulatory architecture to make the legal recognition of transition possible but to get the state out of the business of defining sex in the first place.

Both the classical liberal theory of the state and the Left's critical rejoinder, however, lack the capacity or perhaps the flexibility to account for contradictions in policies for sex reclassification. Perhaps what underlies the inability to account for contradictions in sex classification is the belief that the state actions should manifest an underlying coherence. In fact, the hope — or fear — that we are governed by a single, rational legal structure is belied by the existence of a virtually uncountable number of state institutions, processes, offices, and political jurisdictions. In the United States, for example, when some individuals cross borders, walk into a government office to apply for benefits, get a driver's license, go to jail or prison, sign up for selective service, try to get married, or have any interaction with any state actor, the sex classification of some people can and often does switch. Even within a single jurisdiction, almost every particular state agency — from federal to municipal — has the authority to decide its own rules for sex classification. To complicate matters even more, both state and federal judges have found that one's sex classification for one social function may not hold for others. These include legislatures, courts, departments, agencies, elected officials, political appointees, public servants, constitutions, laws, regulations, administrative rules, and informal norms and practices. These intertwined and sprawling apparatuses all rest, sometimes uneasily, on diachronous layers of sedimented yet still active historical state formations. Given this disarray, it is not surprising that different state entities might sometimes advance different, even incommensurate, projects. Indeed, how could they not?

According to Gilles Deleuze, a concept “should express an event rather than an essence” (1995: 14). Molar, large-scale accounts of sex and the state have assumed a sameness to sex and a singular rationality to state actors, decisions, and projects. If the state is not unitary, coordinated, and hierarchically organized in an ultimately rational way — if, as Michel Foucault suggests, “the state is only a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction whose importance is much less than we think” (1991: 103) — then it should come as no surprise that state definitions of sex are also plural. A contradiction is something that does not make sense, a position that is logically inconsistent. To begin by letting go of the assumption that there is any “there there,” any whatness, to (legal) sex apart from what an agency says it is, the contradiction evaporates. The official sex designation — or, more precisely, the M or the F — stamped on documents or coded in records becomes the starting point. Then an analysis can focus not on what sex is, or what it should be, but on what it does, what it accomplishes, what it produces. Indeed, if the only thing we know for sure about sex is what any of these many state actors say it is in any particular instance, sex will turn out to be as messy and diffuse a concept as the state. Entering into the analysis without a firm sense of what sex is or what the state is — as a priori facts, as edifices — makes the processes through which they come into being more visible. It might be better to defer attempts to resolve — theoretically or politically — the messiness in order to understand what a particular system of sex designation does for a particular state project such as recognition or redistribution (Currah, forthcoming).

Of course, states should not only or always be imagined as messy, scattered nodes of local and arbitrary power arrangements. The Leviathan state's terrible concentrated authority to impose sanctions (death, imprisonment, fines) has been the subject of theories of sovereignty for centuries. For this purpose, the most apt definition of the state begins with the simple description from Max Weber: “A human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate physical violence within a particular given territory” (1991: 78). To create a truly compelling account of sovereign violence and the paradox of sovereignty, one must take Weber's definition, put question marks around “legitimate,” and add the observation made by scholars such as Walter Benjamin, Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt, Jacques Derrida, and Giorgio Agamben that the force that creates the law and makes it legitimate cannot be justified by a law that does not yet exist. Still, much of what states do — regulating the health, safety, and public welfare through myriad regulations, rules, decisions, practices — does not reach the threshold of juridical violence, even if those actions are ultimately undergirded by its threat. Fetishizing a generalized idea of the state and its terrifying or redemptive power (depending on one's perspective) can obscure what is actually happening in the local, micro, particular sites where most public authority is exercised. While it is crucial to theorize the singular finality of state violence, neglecting to examine the messiness of actually existing and potentially incommensurate policies, practices, rules, and norms risks substituting the conceptual for the concrete and gets in the way of understanding what might actually be going on (Latour 1995: 48).

#### Cybernetic enslavement is not inevitable.

Markland, 21—Teaching Fellow in Politics and International Relations at Aston University (Alistair, “Epistemic Transformation at the Margins: Resistance to Digitalisation and Datafication within Global Human Rights Advocacy,” Global Society, February 3, 2021, dml)

As established in the first section of this article, proponents of what I have heuristically defined as the “transformation thesis” have emphasised the revolutionary ruptures wrought by digital connectivity and datafication. Some of these proponents illustrate these changes using field specific case studies, as with Duffield’s (2018) suggestion that the transition to a “cybernetic episteme” is reflected in humanitarian practice. Other authors have taken a more abstract view, including Chandler’s (2018) discussion of new modes of governance in the digital era, or the post-humanist drive to reconceptualise “humanity” under conditions of technological entwinement (Cudworth and Hobden 2013). These assertions of macro-level transformation are also supported by network sociology, led principally by Manuel Castells (2010) analysis of how revolutions in information technology, economic globalisation and an emergent “space of flows” interact to produce a new kind of “network society”. This linkage of societal transformation to economic forces is also characteristic of more critical anti-capitalist perspectives, as with the Marxist critique of “cognitive capitalism” (Moulier-Boutang 2012; Zukerfeld 2017). Although these approaches differ in their conceptual frameworks, they are united in their ambition to highlight universal epistemic transformations brought about by technological change.

One of the pitfalls of these totalising perspectives is the neglect of the particular in favour of the universal. For instance, networked thinking encourages assumptions about lateral transformation across socio-political fields that are connected to the digital universe. But not all spheres of social or political activity move at the same pace when they are exposed to technological innovation. Datafication and digitalisation are processes that have uneven impacts on different social and political fields. For example, the testimony of Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg to the Senate Judiciary and Commerce Committees in April 2018, where US lawmakers appeared confused by the social media giant’s basic business model, is a stark illustration of the gap that still exists between the world of Big Tech and the operating logics of mainstream democratic politics (Stewart 2018). Bigo and Bonelli (2019, 115) have found that even in the field of transnational intelligence, a sphere that could have much to gain from algorithmic techniques, technological expertise tends to be contracted out to third parties while traditional, human-sourced intelligence approaches remain dominant. Therefore, grasping for totalising processes risks ignoring the empirical specificity of divergent social microcosms.

To remedy this blind side in transformationalist thinking, I assert the utility of applying Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory when conceptualising how certain spheres of social or political activity—including the field of global human rights advocacy discussed in the previous section—mediate pressures for epistemic transformation and potentially isolate technological changes and agents to the margins. Employing field theory, Ole Jacob Sending (2015, 11) sees global governance as divided into separate fields, where “actors compete with each other to be recognised as authorities on what is to be governed, how, and why”. Examples of such fields include international development, security, peacebuilding, humanitarianism, and human rights advocacy. However, each field varies in terms of its specific “rules of the game” (Bourdieu and Waquant 1992, 99). Fields are bounded, game-like social structures that are constituted by a unique constellation of actors. These actors struggle for authority according to the field’s principles of legitimation (Bourdieu 1989, 17). These principles of legitimation, which define a field’s cultural capital, are durable to the extent that dominant actors remain invested in their reproduction. Actors’ prolonged immersion in these fields subsequently shapes their own practical sensibilities, so that the field’s logics are internalised as common sense within the habitus (Bourdieu 1990, 53). It is the embedment of the field’s doxa (common sense) within the habitus of invested actors that makes fields durable and resistant to radical transformations. As seen in the previous section, the rules governing the human rights field are associated with its logic of political influence, persuasion, and moral authority.

Critics of Bourdieusian field theory have argued that it is overly structuralist, reproductive, and cannot grasp “the ever-shifting constellations of actors, institutions, data and forms of expression that make up the expertise” (Waever and Leander 2018, 2). However, alternative approaches such as actor-network theory or assemblage-based theories fail to centralise the importance of social and political struggles between agents which are key in defining the trajectory of digitalisation and datafication. As Ruppert, Isin, and Bigo (2017, 3), “[d]ata does not happen through unstructured social practices but through structured and structuring fields in and through which various agents and their interests generate forms of expertise, interpretation, concepts, and methods that collectively function as fields of power and knowledge”. Similarly, “data is not an already given artefact that exists (which then needs to be mined, analysed, brokered) but an object of investment (in the broadest sense) that is produced by the competitive struggles of professionals who claim stakes in its meaning and functioning” (Bigo, Isin, and Ruppert 2019, 11). Technological change can influence the trajectory of different global political fields by enabling the entry of new types of actors (such as data consultants in the case of human rights advocacy), as well as by producing emergent sources of cultural capital and associated epistemic practices (such as expertise in geospatial imaging).

As Bigo and Bonelli (2019, 120) have observed in the case of the transnational intelligence field, technological change can be accompanied by the growing influence of private companies who “have played a substantial role in the recruitment of IT specialists, network engineers, data analysts, integration platform software designers, language and coding specialists, cryptologists, and mathematicians tasked with creating or combining algorithms”. Such entryism can have a revolutionary effect if those new actors are able redefine a field’s organising logic, cultural capital, and principles of legitimation. For example, looking at the case of Sudan in the 1990s as an antecedent to the transformation of humanitarianism, Duffield (2018, 85) traces how donor governments asserted greater control over NGOs, who subsequently “seamlessly morphed into the ‘implementing partners’ of donor governments”. Alongside growing private sector partnerships, these developments stimulated the neoliberal re-alignment of the humanitarian field away from Third World solidarity and the progressive support for autonomous change and towards the governance of precarity. This exposed the field to an epistemic transformation that privileged datafication based on a “surveillance logic of command and control” (ibid., 168).

However, not all global political fields are so structurally conducive to this kind of radical transformation. The example of the human rights advocacy field illustrates how a strong autonomous organising logic—a logic of persuasion—generates entrenched forms of field-specific cultural capital—qualitative and humanistic accounts of raw suffering that establish clear legal responsibilities. Actors can mobilise digital or data infrastructures to diversify the range of tools and media at their disposal, as illustrated by the (limited) use of geospatial technology, data visualisations in human rights reporting, and a growing reliance on social media platforms to engage audiences. However, they do not necessarily threaten the epistemic practices that are at the centre of human rights advocacy. This is because the transformative potential of new technologies and methods depends on their epistemic, political, social, or moral value in the eyes of the fields’ dominant actors. The integration of data-based approaches has been one of slow adaptation, not revolution, and technological specialists—often employed as third-party consultants rather than as full-time human rights professionals—remain at the margins. The Bourdieusian concept of habitus is also helpful in illuminating how fields with strong professional structures and specific educational and career trajectories can endow members with enduring dispositions that favour both the reproduction of existing epistemic practices and resistance to new ones. The habitus of human rights professionals is still primarily defined by legal, journalistic, and liberal-cosmopolitan moral/political dispositions, rather than technological expertise. So long as processes of doxic reproduction remain stable, the potential for epistemic transformation through datafication remains limited.

Conclusion

This article has cautioned against the analytical trend towards treating datafication as a general process acting to radically transform the epistemic and governance practices across global political fields. Because different social and political fields are unique social microcosms that contain divergent organising principles, readers should be wary of post-humanist analyses making totalising claims about alleged transformations in the human condition. The polemical teleology of transformationalism, an approach that is in vogue among Silicon Valley hype merchants like Elon Musk, public intellectuals, and a growing number of social scientists, is certainly attention grabbing, but it does not measure up against the actual way in which technological and methodological innovations are instituted within different fields of practice. International relations and global governance scholars working on the interstitial cross-roads between technology and various political or social lifeworlds need to be attentive to how digital and data transformations are mediated at the meso level of global politics. This article has demonstrated how epistemic transformation can be resisted at the meso level through observing changes and continuities among elite human rights organisations. Bourdieusian field theory, with its emphasis on legitimacy, social reproduction, and the durability of practical dispositions, offers a suitable framework for conceptualising the absence of epistemic rupture within the field of human rights advocacy. However, because digitalisation and datafication processes are mediated through the specific logics of a given field, more work needs to be done on examining how different organising principles shape the potentialities for epistemic transformation. Thus, in the future, more comparative empirical research will be needed to observe technological changes across different areas of global governance.

#### Transhumanism won’t work---BUT, at best, takes hundreds of years.

Fish 9 (Greg, computer science grad student and science blogger whose work appears on BusinessWeek, Discovery News and The Panda’s Thumb, and featured on Bad Astronomy, SEED, and io9. please, leave your brain where it is http://worldofweirdthings.com/2009/05/11/please-leave-your-brain-where-it-is/ [accessed 9/25/10])

A while ago, I took a look into an idea of the Technological Singularity that looks towards a future in which the human mind will reside as pure information within a complex network of computers. Since the first post on the subject, I’ve been getting a slow but steady stream of feedback from proponents who say that with enough time, we can’t discount something like this from happening or that I haven’t given a valid reason why a future technology for transferring human minds to machines won’t work. According to them, if you have a perfect, one to one transfer of the information from the brain to a computer, the human and his consciousness should all be there in an electronic format like a huge collection of files. All you’d need are the right tools for the job… The concept of machine aided immortality is one of those ideas that’s just too good to let go. I may be tempted to believe it myself as an avid reader of science fiction since childhood. But it just so happens that technology is my area of expertise and I’ve worked with computers too long not to hear alarm bells ringing when I picture mad scientists trying to replicate a brain in machine form. When Ray Kurzweil talks about melding minds with microchips, he focuses on the idea that our minds have electrical impulses like computers and our thoughts can be read with proper equipment. However, the issue is a lot more nuanced than that. Just because we can design a probe that can read electrical activity in our nervous systems and activate preprogrammed functions, doesn’t mean that we took a step towards replacing neurons with silicon. Let’s say you wanted to truly download a human mind into a mechanical vessel of some sort. To make it work, your machine would have to work the same exact way as a human brain. That’s not going to happen with just a few futuristic updates. You’d need to rethink how it works from the bottom up, starting with memory and how it uses electrical activity for its basic functions. Electrical pulses in digital equipment like computers come from transistors switched on and off as electricity from a power supply flows to them. Data generated by myriads of these pulses is then recorded to a disk in a computer’s hard drive and can be retrieved when needed with the use an index which keeps track of where on the disk the data is actually recorded. So if you needed to find a file on your computer, the device finds all the places on the hard disk where the file’s data lives and presents it in the correct form via an operating system. A human brain is very different. In the brain, those pulses come from chemical reactions between sodium and potassium. There’s no hard disk where data is stored. Instead, clusters of neurons store the data temporarily and the more you reuse the information, the stronger those connections get and the better you remember it. Another major difference is that computers have limited amounts of data storage because hard disks can fit only so much. But the brain doesn’t have a limit on the amount of information it can store. Forgetting seems to be more of a function of not using the information or being unable to effectively retain it rather than our limit on potential knowledge. Estimates of what capacity the brain has are completely meaningless because they try to apply a the constraints of an electronic system designed to have X amount of storage to a biological network that evolved over millions of years and records memories in much more sophisticated and dynamic ways. So if the Singularity proponents can overlook so basic and so important, what are we to make of the idea that human brains can actually be downloaded or merge with machinery? Well, again, there’s a lot of excitement over the fact that our nervous system generate electrical activity and carry information with pulses of ions. In a computer network, you can get the same pulses to get you the same data on a different machine. But keep in mind that there’s no hard disk to which the data gets recorded in the brain and the electrical activity is used to fire neurotransmitters rather than record files. The brain is the storage, the RAM and the operating system so trying to transfer over the signals neurons send to each other into a computer isn’t going to give you any of the information stored in the person’s mind, not to mention that all you’d be doing in interrupting pulses which will start again as soon as your futile effort is over. The neurons in our brains aren’t just transistors that send ions to each other. They’re what make us who and what we are. Human minds are a product of chemistry and organic connections, swayed by neurotransmitters and hormones, prone to emotions that were passed on from our earliest ancestors as survival mechanisms. When someone like Ray Kurzweil talks about abandoning our bodies, he’s taking his very circumstantial and drastically incomplete knowledge of both computers and human brains, and applies a hefty dose of what can only be described as a technological New Ageism. His idea is based on a typical religious model which sees our bodies as nothing more than vessels for our souls. It’s that soul, that concept of the transcendent human essence, Kurzweil wants to extract and put into a microprocessor to gain a sort of immortality. And in this case, he thinks he found the human soul in the everyday electrical activity of the brain.

#### Their method can’t meaningfully resist surveillance

Lee 14 – Ashlin Lee, PhD in Sociology from University of Tasmania, Honorary Lecturer in Sociology at the Australia National University, Associate Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Tasmania, “A Question of Momentum: Critical Reflections on Individual Options for Surveillance Resistance,” Revista Teknokultura, Volume 11, Number 2, p. 430-433

Resistance Options

This is not to suggest that surveillance is a deterministic social phenomena. Surveillance processes are always a consequence of "the context and comportment" (Marx, 2013, p. 5) of any given social situation, with the outcomes of this situation never predetermined. As Gilliom (2005) notes even the most marginalised and disadvantaged members of society can offer forms of resistance to surveillance, challenging the status quo. But the question is: do these actions actually change the balance of power and the circumstances of surveillance for individuals? Marx (2003, 2009, p. 297) suggests twelve possible "surveillance neutralisation" techniques for individuals to resist surveillance:

Table

Description automatically generated

However, in suggesting these surveillance neutralisation devices, Marx (2009) also notes the potential for methods of resistance to be overcome or nullified through appropriate counter- measures taken by the surveillance system or authority. These countermeasures are a function of the momentum of the surveillance system, as momentum dictates the available resources a system has towards its interests. It is for this reason that any individual act of resistance is likely to be easily countered

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by global surveillance systems – individuals simply lack the ability to confront and neutralise this momentum. Now consider Marx’s typology in this light. His first method of resistance, discovering and raising awareness, is irrelevant as the details of such surveillance systems are already available, and public awareness is at an all time high. These programs still continue. Methods such as refusing surveillance, explaining and con- testing surveillance, and co-operating with surveillance do not actively seek to change the circumstances or vulnerabilities of the individual to data collection and are not of interest here. This leaves a set of neutralisation techniques that focus on making changes to the individual's circumstances, including avoiding or breaking surveillance devices, blocking access to personal data, distorting data capture, switching the captured data, and piggy backing onto accepted or unwatched objects or measures. These behaviours represent confrontational forms of resistance in that they directly challenge the socio-material forms of order that allow surveil- lance to occur. All of these methods are possible for individuals. Personal data may be encrypted to prevent access, and the Internet may be accessed through secure private net- works, or routed through services such as TOR that disrupt monitoring (See TOR 2014). This achieves forms of blocking or masking. An individual may choose to enter false data voluntarily, acting as a means of distorting. A user might access the Internet on someone else's computer or use a friend’s phone, switching the data collected. Individuals are therefore not without options.

But these options are easily countered by global surveillance systems. The technological momentum, and therefore prior investment and development in global surveillance, means that many of the measures suggested have already been countered by those conducting surveil- lance. For example, many standard encryption measures, network equipments, and digital devices have vulnerabilities which state authorities are often aware of and exploit at will (Menn, 2013; Riley, 2014; Der Spiegel, 2013). When these approaches do not suffice, state authorities have designed and constructed network infrastructure and hardware to allow direct access to the fibre optic or copper lines themselves (Aron, 2013). Privacy services like TOR have been penetrated by state security services and their encryption protocols broken (Goodin, 2013). Distortion and switching as a form of resistance are also misleading, as they ignore how services like PRISM rely on databases of previously entered information in addition to real time data collection. Entire datasets of personal information are already in the possession of governments and private corporations already (Lyon, 2001). A sudden change in behaviour or shift in the data collected in real time doesn't change prior knowledge, and the analytical and comparative potential of these datasets persists. Data collected and circulated within these databases is notoriously difficult to remove, and is often outside the awareness and means of individuals themselves (Lyon, 2002). Finally in many cases those conducting surveillance have enormous ranges of extra techniques for collecting personal information. Security organisations in the service of nation states and private companies have a range of covert and exotic measures for data collection (Der Spiegel, 2013), and consumer level surveillance is often built into the many digital infrastructure, networks, and standards that consumers use (Prid- more, 2012). Companies and authorities have also been extraordinarily successful in "seducing" users away from resistance to complicity (Lyon, 2007, p. 102). What this suggests is that for individuals confrontational measures of resistance are limited, and that any meaningful shift in the material realities of data collection is difficult.

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### Logistical Cap D---2NC

#### Logistics aren’t a totalizing system of violence and institutional reprogramming can alter it

Chua 18 – Charmaine Chua, Professor of Politics at Oberlin College, PhD from the University of Minnesota, et al., “Introduction: Turbulent Circulation: Building a Critical Engagement with Logistics”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, Volume 36, Number 4, p. 622-624

Yet logistical space is also riven with contradictions and constantly faced with the real and potential catastrophes posed by “gigantic breakdowns and stoppages” (Mumford, 1961: 544). As Rossiter, 2014 reminds us, the ambitions of logistics are ultimately “operational fantasies” (2014: 54) that rely on, even as they aim to contain, a recalcitrant polity through calculative forms of domination and repression. As such, we should be careful not to reify logistics as a seamless system of instantaneous flow and total functional integration.

By paying attention to the frictions and stoppages that are part and parcel of logistical processes, critical scholars have noted that even as logistics is taken up as a tool of imperial dispossession and capitalist power, it also produces new sites of vulnerability and potential emancipation. To this end, logistics has become a growing force not only among states, corporations, military forces, and aid organizations but also within social movements and activist organizations that aim to challenge their practice. Beyond the accidental breakdowns and stoppages that threaten just-in-time supply chains are more deliberate efforts to interrupt the circulation of violence and remake environmentally and socially just forms of provisioning and sustaining.

A critical engagement with logistics is a feature not simply of academic practice but of intellectual, political, and practical organizing across various sectors of work and arenas of contestation. These efforts are clearly not brand new—not only in the transportation sector, where workers have long struggled over their conditions of work, but in myriad movements that have worked to sustain themselves over time, including through uprisings, occupations, and revolutions. As logistics has ascended to a place of prominence in the organization of war and trade globally, it has also become subject to new frequencies and forms of contestation. Alberto Toscano (2014) highlights this shift when he asks, “Can we define or declare a relocation of political and class conflict, in the overdeveloped de-industrializing countries of the ‘Global North,’ from the point of production to the chokepoints of circulation?” Such an approach centers sites of physical circulation as pressure points where mass movements can contest the violence of state and capital, signaling a shift in tactics from the withdrawal of productive labor power to disruptive blockades and sabotage along the arteries of trade (Clover, 2016; Degenerate Communism, 2014; Oakland Commune, 2011).

A scholarly discourse has emerged under the banner of “counterlogistics” that engages labor, anticolonial, and antiracist struggles (Bernes, 2013; Chua et al., 2016; Fox-Hodess, 2017). We might also trace a growing reliance on a critical practice that explicitly names the field: logistics groups, tents, and committees are now a mainstay of radical organizing, pointing to the possible repurposing of logistical models as sources of care and social reproduction (Armstrong, 2015; Cowen, 2014; Crashnburn, 2014). As Attewell (2018) argues in this issue, initiatives like the US Agency for International Development’s Commodity Export Program “contain within them the germ of a different kind of logistics: one that preserves its will to care, while dispensing with its necropolitical baggage” (735). In this vein, one fertile arena for future research is to examine more expansive possibilities for counterlogistics—asking, following Toscano (2014), “What happens then if we consider the question of circulation less literally? And what would it mean to struggle not simply against material flows but against the social forms that channel them?” By focusing on the social relations that underpin logistical processes, critical engagements with logistics might be productively nudged towards more emancipatory political ends by exploring how counterlogistical contestation is being waged not only in the sectors we might immediately associate with goods circulation but so too in the broader social relations of logistical society.

Yet we should be careful not to fetishize counterlogistical projects without a firm grasp on how the state and capital are invested in controlling the spaces of stocks and flows. Attempts at resisting or disrupting circulation can be co-opted, contained, or absorbed—in the construction of redundant container shipping networks, for example, which give corporations multiple options for rerouting cargo around traffic bottlenecks or restive labor forces. Further, as Timothy Mitchell (2011: chap. 1) and Dara Orenstein (2018) have shown, tactics of sabotage and disruption have themselves become integral to processes of value realization, where capital’s power rests not only in speeding up circulation but also in the capacity to slow it down. More broadly, while the growing prominence of “circulation struggles” (Clover, 2016) presents rich ground for scholarly exploration and political organizing, there is a danger in fetishizing the tactics of material interruption per se. More important than the form of political resistance are its contents, the concrete social relations in which it is embedded and that it seeks to transform. As Chua (2017: 165) argues, “even if material structures are constitutive of the extant political order,” the act of disrupting or sabotaging material flows alone is not enough to reconfigure logistics: “circulation struggles can only have revolutionary potential if collective power is politically mobilized across the supply chain.”

Logistical systems increasingly encroach on everyday life under the justification that rapid, efficient circulation is necessary to the welfare of the economy, the state, and its people. Yet, as both a calculative rationality and a practice of spatial ordering, mainstream iterations of logistics work to promote the accumulation of capital and state power in ways that exacerbate existing inequalities and produce new dispositions of life and death (see Attewell, 2018). The articles collected in this issue point to the myriad ways these apparatuses also distribute inequality, immiseration, and “vulnerability to premature death” (Gilmore, 2007: 28). At the same time, the gap between the idealized imagination of logistics and its messy implementation reveals that the project of making the world safe for circulation is always incomplete. A critical engagement with logistics attends to the struggles, social conflicts, and tensions that can never be excised from global flows. This liveliness of logistics is one aspect that comes to the fore in this theme issue. Interrogating the multiple, varied, and contested lives of logistics brings into focus the violence committed in its name, the vulnerabilities of its networks, and the political possibilities latent in its present-day forms.

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## Radical Humanism K

### Link---Transhumanism

#### Its ultimate end is flush with post-humanist rhetoric and intent with the means and ends to ‘go beyond’ humanism.

Yolande Jansen et al. 21, Associate Professor, Social & Political Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam; Jasmijn Leeuwenkamp, PhD, Philosophy, University of Amsterdam; Leire Urricelqui, Department of Philosophy, Karl Franzens University, "Posthumanism and the ‘Posterizing Impulse’," in Post-Everything, Chapter 11, 07/17/2021, Manchester Open Hive.

Like with most other post-concepts, it is difficult to delineate an unequivocal historical development of posthumanism, even though the term has a relatively precise origin, as we already noted. Thinking ‘beyond’ or ‘after’ humanism can be attributed to many authors, who do not necessarily identify themselves as posthumanist thinkers. Even within the philosophical context, the term ‘posthumanism’ can be attributed to ideas from radically different strands of thought. Moreover, due to the intertwinement with other concepts, such as ‘antihumanism’ and ‘postmodernism’, and the emergence of new, related concepts such as ‘transhumanism’,38 there is not one evident genealogical narrative to reconstruct. ‘Posthumanism’ can, therefore, be very roughly defined as ‘an umbrella term for ideas that explain, promote or deal with the crisis of humanism’.39

If we understand posthumanism as announcing and theorizing the end of man as the centre of the universe, the origins of this idea can be said to have developed long before the term was used. Several authors go back to Marx,40 Nietzsche,41 Heidegger,42 or Foucault43 to signal the beginning of the movement they retrospectively call ‘posthumanism’. They argue that these theorists were pivotal for establishing the idea that man is not so much the Cartesian rational and autonomous subject that was envisioned by the humanist ideal of Man, while they were also not doing so from an ani-modern standpoint. According to Rosi Braidotti, a shift in how human nature is conceptualized is at the core of all posthumanist theory:

Far from being the n[in]th variation in a sequence of prefixes that may appear both endless and somehow arbitrary, the posthuman condition introduces a qualitative shift in our thinking about what exactly is the basic unit of common reference for our species, our polity and our relationship to the other inhabitants of this planet.44

In short, according to Braidotti, posthumanism should be seen as a historical moment, or rather shift, in which the traditional ways in which human beings as a biological species and as moral creatures have been conceptualized have increasingly become regarded as untenable. However, the question of which idea(s) gave a significant urgency to this shift is difficult to answer.

The diversity regarding the origins of the concept has everything to do with the sort of ‘posthuman’ that is envisioned. As mentioned, we can generally distinguish two different but interrelated strands of posthumanism. Even though both share ‘the notion of technogenesis’,45 as Francesca Ferrando46 points out, it is in their differences that, crucially, lies an understanding of these two philosophical approaches. First, the strand usually called ‘transhumanism’ departs from the idea that technological, genetic and biomedical developments can and should ultimately lead to the emerging of a new type of human – the posthuman.47 David Roden calls this more futuristic line of thought ‘speculative posthumanism’ as it is ‘not a normative claim about how the world ought to be but a metaphysical claim about what it could contain’.48 The second perspective, developed by Stefan Herbrechter, among others, can be called ‘critical posthumanism’. It draws on the idea that the humanist ideal of man as a progressive being must be critically reconsidered and revised. It can, therefore, be seen as a ‘philosophical corrective to humanism’.49 If posthumanism aspires to challenge and overcome humanism, transhumanism considers the intellectual and physical limitations of the human being as something that needs to be overcome by the technological control of biological evolution. In what follows, we will go into the central characteristics of both currents to better understand the aspects in which they differ or, even, are radically opposed.

In 1957 the biologist Julian Huxley coined the term transhumanism to refer to the possibility of the human species transcending itself in its totality: ‘It [transhumanism] is the idea of humanity attempting to overcome its limitations and to arrive at fuller fruition; it is the realization that both individual and social developments are processes of self-transformation.’50 Although he did not assign to it the same meaning as his successors, the term ultimately denoted a radical transcending of man’s biological limitations.51

In the 1980s, transhumanists began to identify themselves with this term and line of thought, forming the modern philosophical notion of transhumanism that prevails today. Over the decade, FM-203052 and Natasha Vita-More began teaching classes on transhumanism in Los Angeles, Eric Drexler founded the Foresight Institute, and Max More established the Extropy Institute. In 1990, More wrote the foundations of modern transhumanism in Principles of Extropy and Transhumanism: A Futurist Philosophy. In 1998, philosophers Nick Bostrom and David Pearce founded the World Transhumanist Association and, together with the authors already mentioned as well as others, approved the Transhumanist Declaration.53 Based on the ideas conceived by More, transhumanism is here defined as:

1. The intellectual and cultural movement that affirms the possibility and desirability of fundamentally improving the human condition through applied reason, especially by developing and making widely available technologies to eliminate ageing and to greatly enhance human intellectual, physical, and psychological capacities.
2. The study of the ramifications, promises, and potential dangers of technologies that will enable us to overcome fundamental human limitations, and the related study of the ethical matters involved in developing and using such technologies.54

In this way, transhumanists believe that the existing forms of the human are at an intermediate stage that needs to be challenged to advance towards a human form in which bodies, as well as intelligence, will be enhanced for a higher utility and purpose. Reaching this goal means, for them, entering the stage of ‘the posthuman’. According to transhumanists, the enhancement of human nature towards a posthuman nature will be reached through technological development: ‘By thoughtfully, carefully, and yet boldly applying technology to ourselves, we can become something no longer accurately described as human – we can become posthuman.’55 The posthuman is thus the future human that will overcome all those undesirable characteristics of the present human condition, such as ageing and death. Furthermore, ‘posthumans would also have much greater cognitive capabilities, and more refined emotions (more joy, less anger, or whatever changes each individual prefers)’.56 Transhumanism is, in this way, a techno-deterministic and techno-utopian form of posthumanism in which the telos of humanity’s future will be achieved through technology.57